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Abstract
Cascading failures constitute an important vulnerability of interconnected systems. Here we focus on the
study of such failures on networks in which the connectivity of nodes is constrained by geographical dis-
tance. Specifically, we use random geometric graphs as representative examples of such spatial networks,
and study the properties of cascading failures on them in the presence of distributed flow. The key finding
of this study is that the process of cascading failures is non-self-averaging on spatial networks, and thus,
aggregate inferences made from analyzing an ensemble of such networks lead to incorrect conclusions
when applied to a single network, no matter how large the network is. We demonstrate that this lack of
self-averaging disappears with the introduction of a small fraction of long-range links into the network.
We simulate the well studied preemptive node removal strategy for cascade mitigation and show that it
is largely ineffective in the case of spatial networks. We introduce an altruistic strategy designed to limit
the loss of network nodes in the event of a cascade triggering failure and show that it performs better
than the preemptive strategy. Finally, we consider a real-world spatial network viz. a European power
transmission network and validate that our findings from the study of random geometric graphs are also
borne out by simulations of cascading failures on the empirical network.
Introduction
Cascading failures represent a particular vulnerability of networked systems, and their effects have been
experienced and documented in several domains such as infrastructure networks [1], financial systems [2],
and biological systems [3]. An important feature of real-world networks that has not been incorporated
into most studies on cascading failures, with some notable exceptions [4–6], is the fact that they are subject
to spatial constraints. In other words, in most real-world networks, which node a given node connects to,
or interacts with, is largely determined by the geographic distance between the two nodes. This rather
severe constraint has important consequences on the network’s behavior, and gives rise to significant
differences in the scaling behavior of quantities of interest when compared to spatially unconstrained
networks [7].
In the context of cascading failures and strategies for their mitigation, studying the effect of spatial
constraints is crucial to providing fundamental insights that are practically applicable. A specific context
within which studies of cascading failures have proliferated is that of electrical power transmission systems
[4,5,8–12]. However, understanding such failures in the more general context of flow bearing networks is
just as important, especially when confronted with the imminent rise of technologies like the Internet of
Things [13], which essentially consists of everyday physical objects equipped with sensors to communicate
with users or other objects within their range.
Motivated by these reasons, we study a model of load-based cascading failures on networks on a
particular class of spatially constrained networks - the Random Geometric Graph (RGG) [14,15] - carrying
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2distributed flows and compare its behavior to that of unconstrained network classes. Closely related earlier
and recent works, employing resistor networks, investigated transport efficiency, flow optimization, and
vulnerability in complex networks [16–20], and the emergence of traffic gridlocks and congestion in road
networks [21,22].
To validate the insights obtained from these spatially-embedded model networks (RGGs), we also
study the same load-based cascading failure process on a real-world network with spatial constraints -
the European power transmission network maintained and operated by the Union for the Co-ordination
of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE). We find several revealing features that arise from the presence of
spatial constraints, the most noticeable being a lack of self-averaging on such networks. This is in stark
contrast to the results for unconstrained random networks, and thus points to the potential pitfalls of
ignoring spatial constraints when studying cascade mitigation strategies.
Methods
Here, we briefly describe the distributed flow model and cascade model that we utilize in this study. For
clarity, we note that we use the term ‘node’ and ‘vertex’ interchangeably in the rest of the paper.
1. Distributed flow
We assume the flow on the network to be both directed and distributed. Specifically, each unit of flow
is associated with a source and a sink, and takes advantage of all possible paths between the source and
the sink. We adopt a simple model of such flow, by modeling the network as a random resistor network
with unit conductances along the links [19, 20]. As each node and edge plays a role in forwarding the
current from the source to the target node, each of them experiences a load. For one source-target pair
and for unit current flowing between them, the load on an arbitrary edge e ≡ (i, j) is the current along
that edge: `ij = I
(st)
ij ; analogously, the load on an arbitrary node i is the net current flowing through
that node: `i = I
(st)
i . These two loads are related by the expression
I
(st)
i =
1
2
∑
j
|I(st)ij |. (1)
For all our studies presented here, we assume that unit current flows between N source/target pairs
simultaneously. Specifically, we assume that all nodes are simultaneously sources and unit current flows
into the network at each source. For each source node, a target is chosen randomly and uniformly from
the remaining N − 1 nodes. Consequently, the load is defined as the superposition of all currents flowing
through an arbitrary edge/node, which is identical to the edge/node current-flow betweenness [20,23,24]:
`ij =
1
N − 1
N∑
s,t=1
|I(st)ij |, `i =
1
N − 1
N∑
s,t=1
|I(st)i |. (2)
Currents I
(st)
ij along the edges due to one source/target pair are obtained by writing down Kirchhoff’s
law for each node i in the network and solving the system of linear equations:
N∑
j=1
Aij(Vi − Vj) = I(δis − δit), ∀i = 1, . . . , N, (3)
where we assumed that I units of current flow into the network at a source s and leave at a target t,
and where Aij denotes the adjacency matrix of the network. Rewritten in terms of the weighted network
3Laplacian Lij = δijki − Aij , where ki =
∑
j Aij denotes the degree of node i, the system (3) transforms
into the matrix equation LV = I, where V is the unknown column voltage vector, while Ii is the net
current flowing into the network at node i, which is zero for all nodes with the exception of the source and
target nodes. As the network Laplacian L is singular, we use spectral decomposition [18, 25] to find the
pseudo-inverse Laplacian G = L−1, defined in the space orthogonal to the zero mode. For example, by
choosing the reference potential to be the mean voltage [17], Vˆi = Vi−〈V 〉, where 〈V 〉 = (1/N)
∑N
j=1 Vj ,
one obtains:
Vˆi = (GI)i =
N∑
j=1
GijI(δjs − δjt) = I(Gis −Git), (4)
for each node i. Thus, for I units of current and for a given source/target pair, the current flowing
through edge (i, j) is:
I
(st)
ij = Aij(Vi − Vj) = AijI(Gis −Git −Gjs +Gjt), (5)
This relation shows that current along an arbitrary edge is uniquely determined by the network topology.
Therefore, this is a fully deterministic model of flow and the only source of randomness in the problem
arises in the specific instantiation of the network from its parent ensemble.
Electrical flows when applied to explicitly modeling the power grid have commonly used a DC power
flow model [4, 5, 11, 12, 26] wherein links also possess a reactance in addition to resistance. However,
as pointed out in [4], the equations for this DC model of power flow bear a close resemblance to that
of a simple electrical circuit with the current playing the analogous role of power. Further, Scala et
al. [11] have demonstrated that inferences made using a DC power flow model, can still be useful despite
neglecting the true AC nature of the power transmission network [27]. We emphasize that although
the empirical network on which we validate our results is an electrical grid, our studies are aimed at
understanding fundamental aspects of cascades on spatial networks carrying distributed flow, and not
towards designing strategies specifically tailored for electrical power transmission systems.
2. Cascade model
We model a cascading failure on a network carrying distributed flow following the seminal model of
Motter and Lai [28]. We assume that each node is equipped with a load handling capacity that is
proportional to the steady-state load on it when the network is intact. Specifically, the capacity of a
node i is Ci = (1 + α)`
0
i where α plays the role of a tolerance parameter, and `
0
i is the load on the node
for the intact network. If a node on the network fails, i.e. is absent or removed from the network, then
the flow undergoes a redistribution, and consequently, so do the loads on the surviving nodes. If the new
load on any surviving node exceeds its capacity, i.e. if `i > Ci, then that node also fails which leads to
a further redistribution and possibly further failures. This process constitutes the model of a cascading
failure that we utilize here.
3. Network models
We briefly outline the network models used in this paper and the methods employed for generating
associated ensembles.
Random Geometric Graphs
A Random Geometric Graph (RGG) of size N in 2D is constructed by placing N nodes randomly in the
unit square with open boundary conditions, and connecting any pair of nodes if the Euclidean distance
between them is less than a distance R, the connection radius [14, 15]. The average degree of the graph
〈k〉 can be controlled by varying R since 〈k〉 = piR2N .
4Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs
An Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graph [29] of sizeN is constructed by connecting every pair of nodes with probability
p. The average degree of the network can be controlled through p since 〈k〉 = p(N − 1).
Scale-Free networks
Scale-free (SF) networks [30] of size N and degree-exponent γ are constructed by first generating a degree
sequence by sampling the prescribed power-law distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ that yields a desired average-
degree 〈k〉. The network is then constructed using this degree sequence following the Configuration
Model [31].
Rewired Random Geometric Graphs
To better understand the role of spatial constraints in the observed characteristics of cascades on spatial
networks, we generated rewired RGGs as follows. Starting with the original spatial network, we rewire an
arbitrarily chosen end of each link to a randomly chosen node in the network with probability p. During
this process, we ensure that no self-loops or multiple edges are generated, by rejecting any rewiring step
that leads to these undesired features.
4. Empirical Network
As a realistic testbed on which to validate our results, we use the UCTE European power transmission
network from the year 2002 [32–34], which we will henceforth refer to simply as the UCTE network. This
network is spread over a geographic area that comprises 18 countries, and consists of N = 1254 buses
which constitute the nodes for our purposes. The average degree of the network is 〈k〉 = 2.89.
Results
1. Load landscapes in RGGs
We begin by analyzing the vertex load distributions in RGGs and comparing them to those in ER graphs
with the same average degree, the latter playing the role of a null-model where spatial constraints are
absent. Both RGGs and ER graphs are characterized by homogeneous (Poissonian) degree distributions
[35]. In addition, RGGs exhibit a high clustering coefficient [15], resulting from the spatial dependance
of the connectivity and the transitivity of spatial relationships. Path lengths on RGGs scale with the
network size N in contrast to the logN scaling found in ER graphs. Given these differences, we expect
that the vertex load distribution for RGGs would also differ significantly from that of ER graphs. Indeed,
as shown in Figs. 1A and 1B respectively, the vertex load distribution for RGGs has an exponentially
decaying tail with a decay constant u 0.083, while the distribution for ER graphs is best-fitted by a
Gaussian distribution (parameters in caption). For identical average degrees, the mean vertex-load in
RGGs, (〈`〉 = 32.54), is almost six times as large as that for ER graphs. Figure 1C shows the average
vertex-load conditioned on the vertex-degree, as a function of the degree. Again, in contrast to the case
of ER graphs, the plot for RGGs does not display an unambiguously positive correlation of vertex-load
with degree over the entire degree range. The vertex-loads are strongly correlated with degrees up until a
value close to the average degree, after which they show a subtle decline. A visualization of the network
(Fig. 1D) makes it clear that the nodes with the highest loads do not have degrees anywhere as high as
the largest degree in the network.
For a network where connections are spatially constrained, we intuitively expect that a high load on
a node is indicative of a high load in its neighborhood. To substantiate this, we investigate the spatial
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Figure 1. Vertex load profiles in RGGs and ER networks. Calculated on (A) random geometric
graphs and (B) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random grahs, composed of N = 1500 nodes with 〈k〉 = 10 and averaged
over 2000 network realizations. (C) Positive correlations are shown in the case of ER graphs, while
these correlations seem to disappear in RGGs for degree classes higher than the average degree of the
network ensemble. Data were averaged over more than 3000 network realizations for networks of
N = 1000 and 〈k〉 = 10. The fluctuating tail of the red curve originates from the lack of sufficient
number of samples in the specific degree classes. The error bars correspond to one standard deviations.
(D) A single network realization showing the vertex loads. Note, that the node with the highest
connections (blue arrows indicate the 3 highest degree nodes) does not carry the highest load in the
network (loads are color coded, and node sizes are proportional to loads).
correlation between vertex loads on the network. Specifically, we measure the correlation between vertex
loads as a function of the distance separating them, by systematically obtaining all pairs of nodes (i, j)
separated by a distance that lies within (r−∆r, r+∆r), and computing the Pearson correlation coefficient
between these pairs:
CL(r) =
∑
i,j|rij∈(r−∆r/2,r+∆r/2)(`i − 〈`i〉)(`j − 〈`j〉)
σiσj
(6)
Figure 2A shows the Pearson correlation coefficient between loads at a distance r apart from each
other. 150 evenly spaced values of r were considered within the complete range (0,
√
2/2), with ∆r =
√
2/2
150 .
The resulting picture shows that loads are positively correlated for nodes within a distance r = R where
R is the connection radius, while just beyond this value the correlation sharply drops and continues
to decrease monotonically thereafter, reaching slightly negative values at very large separations. The
picture obtained for networks with different average degrees is qualitatively similar, and does not change
significantly for rewired RGGs generated using small values of the rewiring parameter. It is worth
610
2
10
3
10
1
10
2
RGG
p=0.005
p=0.01
ER
! m
a
x
N
B A 
    





 <k>=10, rgg
<k>=7.5, rgg
p=0.005
p=0.01
r
C
B
(r
)
RGG, 〈k〉 = 10
RGG, 〈k〉 = 7.5
= .005, 〈k〉 = 7.5
= .01, 〈k〉 = 7.5
GG
. 05
.01
∼ N0.75
∼ N0.25
Figure 2. Correlations of vertex loads as a function of distance between vertices and
extreme value characteristics of loads. (A) Load and distance correlations in RGG. Pearson
correlation coefficient as function of distance r measured between two arbitrary nodes. Data were
averaged over 100 network realizations for networks having 500 nodes. (B) System size dependence of
the maximum vertex load in networks with 〈k〉 = 6. Data were averaged over 2000 network realizations.
The parameter p corresponds to the rewiring probability for links in the RGG.
mentioning that although the spatial correlation captured by the Pearson correlation coefficient indicates
vertex loads being correlated only within a short distance, it does not preclude the existence of lower
dimensional correlated structures - such as a 1D backbone formed by vertices with high loads [36] -within
the network. To conclude this study of the load profiles, we analyze the extreme value scaling of the load
distribution with network size N , a quantity of significance in determining the effective throughput of
the network [37]. As shown in Fig. 2B, the maximum vertex load on RGGs scales as a power law with N ,
with an exponent of 0.75. This is a much faster growth in comparison to the scaling,∼ N0.25 found for
ER graphs. Rewiring the links of the RGG with increasing probability p, gradually but systematically
lowers the loads, and their scaling. (The scaling exponents found for p = 0.005 and p = 0.01 are 0.545
and 0.44 respectively.)
2. Cascades of overload failures
Next, we simulate cascading failures on a network triggered either by random or targeted removals of
nodes, and quantify the resilience of the network to such failures. The model used (see Methods) is
identical to that used in earlier studies [19, 28, 38], and is parametrized by a single tolerance parameter
α which quantifies the excess load bearing capacity of a node. Following the notation introduced in [28],
the resilience of a network is quantified in terms of the fractional size of the surviving largest connected
component after the cascade ends: G = N ′/N , where N ′ is the number of nodes belonging to the largest
network component after the cascade and N is the undamaged (connected) network size.
Figure 3A shows the probability that a cascade ensues after an initial node removal. As seen, irrespec-
tive of the tolerance parameter, cascades triggered by the removal of the node with the highest load in the
network leave behind the largest damage when compared with those resulting from removal of the highest
degree node or a random node. Figures 3B,C show the fractional size of the surviving giant component
G as a function of the tolerance parameter in the presence and the absence of a cascade. Once again, the
damage done is the worst for the case where the initial node removed is the one with the maximal load,
even in the case where no cascade is triggered, suggesting that vertices with the highest loads are those
responsible for bridging together distinct connected components and ensuring the structural integrity of
the network. Finally, Fig. 3D compares the damage done due to cascading failures on RGGs with the
7Figure 3. Cascades triggered by targeted and random removals. (A) Probability that a single
node removal will trigger a cascade as function of the tolerance parameter. (B) The ratio G of the size
of the largest surviving network component to the initial network size, as function of α, the tolerance
parameter when the initial failure triggers a cascade. (C) Similar to (B), except for the case where the
initial failure does not trigger a cascade. In all (A), (B) and (C) subplots the red curve corresponds to
the case when the triggered node is the node with the highest load, the blue curve to the case when the
triggered node is the most connected node in the network and the green curve shows the case when the
triggered node was chosen randomly. Network parameters are N = 1500, 〈k〉 = 6.0, while the data was
averaged over 500 network realizations. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. (D) G
as a function of tolerance parameter, unconditioned on whether or not a cascade was triggered for
RGGs, SF networks and ER networks.
damage in SF and ER networks, all having the same average degree. Clearly, while increasing excess
capacity does lead to an increase, on average, of the surviving giant component, the growth is profoundly
slower for RGGs than for the spatially unconstrained networks. Henceforth, as we further investigate
more detailed characteristics of cascades, we restrict our studies to cascades triggered by the removal of
the vertex with the highest load, since the damage done to the network is the most severe in this case.
As shown above, increased capacity allocation results in a monotonic increase in the average surviving
giant component size, where the averaging is done over an ensemble of network realizations. If such a
monotonic increase was also obtained for individual network instances, then increased capacity allocation,
although only weakly effective, would at least be a justifiable preventative measure against cascades.
Figures 4 A, B show the size of the surviving giant component G as a function of the tolerance parameter
α for three individual instances of RGGs, for different respective average degrees. As is clearly seen,
the variation in G is far from monotonic for a single network instance, and differs significantly across
instances. Thus, the trend observed by averaging a macroscopic quantity, G, over an ensemble of RGG
8networks (as was the case in Fig. 3) provides little indication of the true behavior of the same quantity for
an individual network instance. This behavior persists even if the network size is increased (not shown).
Such lack of self-averaging has been observed previously in fragmentation processes on lattices, to which
cascades bear a close resemblance [39]. In contrast, results of cascades on single instances of ER and
SF networks, shown in Figs. 4B,C, are consistent with those obtained by averaging G over respective
network ensembles.
Presumably, this lack of self-averaging is a feature that results from the embedding of the network in
two-dimensions (with no shortcuts). To conclusively validate this argument, we study how the presence
of a few spatially unconstrained links affects the surviving giant component size, since the addition of
such links has the effect of increasing the underlying dimensionality of the space in which the network is
embedded. Specifically, for each link, we rewire with probability p one end of the link with a randomly
chosen node in the network, without allowing self-loops or multiple edges to form. Similar constructions
have been used before in [40–42]. By varying p between 0 and 1, we can interpolate between RGGs and
ER graphs, as is confirmed by the results shown in Fig. 5, where both the degree-conditioned average load
and the average load undergo a smooth crossover from the results expected for RGGs to those expected
for ER graphs. Figure 6 shows that even with as low as 5% of the links of the RGG rewired, the non-
monotonicity in G versus α completely disappears. The interval of p within which the crossover takes
place contains values larger than the theoretical estimate of p∗ ∼ 1/(〈k〉N/2) [43] at which the small-
world crossover occurs, likely a finite-size-effect due to the small system sizes considered here. Thus, from
a theoretical network-design point of view, the incorporation of a few long-range links would be a simple
step in stabilizing flows and managing cascades, since it results in a more predictable relationship between
surviving-component size and excess capacity. However, in practical situations the cost of adding such
long-range links could be prohibitive, and therefore may not constitute a feasible solution for controlling
the grid.
We also studied how length dependent link-conductances affected our results. Specifically, we assumed
that Cij = Aij/dij for a link connecting nodes i and j where dij denotes the Euclidean distance between
them, and performed simulations to study the dependence of the surviving giant component size G as
a function of the tolerance parameter α (analogous to results in Fig. 4 A,B), and to investigate the
effect of rewiring links to create a few long-range connections in the network (similar to the results in
Fig. 6). For both cases, we found no significant quantitative difference in the results for the case where
conductances were length-dependent. In particular, the non-self-averaging nature of cascades manifested
itself in exactly the same manner as is demonstrated in Supplementary Figs. S1 and S2.
As a next step in understanding the nature of spatial cascades, we measure the spatial correlations
between nodes that fail in successive stages of the cascade. Here, a single stage refers to a round of calcu-
lating vertex loads, and removing those nodes whose load exceeds their respective capacity. Figure. 7A
shows the average location of failing nodes per stage of the cascade, relative to the node that triggers
the cascade. The most significant feature observed here, as well as in the distribution of distance (from
the cascade-triggering node) for failing nodes in each cascade stage (Fig. 7B) is the separation between
the most likely locations for nodes removed in the first and second stages. In subsequent stages, the
distribution of the location of failing nodes gets progressively more uniform. In general, as seen from
our simulations, cascades last for only a few stages (the longest found in the systems studied here was
11 stages) with most of the damage occurring by the second stage, and then declining rapidly. The
stage-wise distributions in Fig. 7B were obtained by aggregating all nodes removed in a particular stage
and belonging to a particular distance bin over 540 distinct cascades, and normalizing them by the total
number of nodes removed over the distinct cascades. Thus, declining contribution of later stages is due
to a combination of two factors: the reduction in the number of nodes removed during later stages, and
the decrease in the probability of the cascade surviving up to that stage. The all-stage distribution was
generated in a similar fashion as the stage-wise distribution, but disregarding the stages associated with
the nodes.
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Figure 4. Cascades on single network realizations. Simulations were performed on networks of
size N = 1300. Fractional size of surviving giant component as a function of α for (A),(B) RGGs,
(C),(D) ER networks and (E),(F) SF networks.
Finally in this section, we study the effect of average degree of RGGs on their resilience to cascading
failures. Figure 8 compares the fractional size of the largest connected component as a function of α
for networks with average degree 〈k〉 = 6 and 〈k〉 = 10. Surprisingly, the damage caused by cascading
failures is far more severe for the more well connected of the two network ensembles. Although, for
other dynamical processes such as epidemic spreading and diffusion it is intuitively obvious that more
connections lead to more spread, here we would expect that the presence of more paths between any
source-sink pair on a denser network would lead to more effective load balancing, and therefore weaker
cascading failures. However, while increasing the average degree does cause loads for each node to be
lower and more balanced initially, the excess capacity allocation in proportion to these lower and more
uniform loads, makes the network ill-equipped to handle variations in load resulting from the initial node
removal. As a result, cascades cause more damage for a denser RGG than a sparser one. In contrast, as
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the lack of self-averaging manifested by the non-monotonicities in the curves for G versus α disappears.
is well known, denser RGGs are structurally more resilient to random (non-cascading) failures occurring
in the network, since the giant component undergoes a transition in size at fc = 1 − 〈kc〉〈k〉 [44, 45] where
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error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean.
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fc is the critical fraction of randomly removed nodes from a RGG, and 〈kc〉 is an embedding-dimension
dependent constant taking the value 4.52 [15] for two dimensions.
3. Cascade mitigation strategies
Next, we study two cascade mitigation strategies and evaluate their effectiveness. We begin by analyzing
the preemptive node removal strategy proposed by Motter [38]. Intuitively, this method aims to utilize
node removal in such a way that the two competing objectives of reducing the load on the network,
and keeping the network connected, are balanced. Specifically, the method involves removing a fraction
f of the lowest load nodes after the initial node failure. This method was motivated by studies on
scale-free networks where the load distribution is heavy-tailed implying that a significant fraction of
nodes despite contributing to the total load on the network by acting as sources of current/packets,
only frugally participate in the carrying of loads generated by other source-sinks pairs, due to their
low betweenness. The load distribution for RGGs however, is comparatively much narrower, and we
would therefore expect that preemptive node removal would not yield significant success. The results
of investigating the efficacy of preemptive node removal as a cascade mitigation strategy are presented
in Fig. 9. As shown in Fig. 9A, the probability of a cascade occurring decreases (with increasing f)
until it reaches a minimum, and beyond which, it increases again. A similar profile is also observed for
the ensemble averaged values of the fractional size of the giant surviving component G as a function of
f . Both plots show however, that even at the optimal f , and for as large as 50% additional capacity
(i.e. α = 0.5), the gains obtained are weak. Furthermore, as a consequence of the lack of self-averaging,
individual network instances show profiles that are highly variable and showing little resemblance to the
ensemble averaged results. Three such examples for individual network instances are shown in Fig. 9C.
Finally, we study how the throughput in the giant surviving component after a cascade, φf , compares
to the throughput on the original network, φi. The throughput captures the maximum current that can
be injected per source without the network becoming congested. For φ units of current injected at every
source, the network is uncongested if for every node j, the inequality, φj ≤ Cj holds. Consequently, for
the intact network (indicated by subscript i), the throughput is φi =
1
maxj{lj/Cj} . The throughput can
similarly be calculated for the surviving component after a cascade. As shown in Fig. 9D, the throughput
after the cascade φf is larger than the initial throughput for f > 0. The increase in throughput is expected
since the size of the network is smaller after a cascade, leading to a reduction in loads (due to the N
dependance in the definition of loads, see Eq. 2) and thereby an increase in the quantity maxj{lj/Cj}.
For the case where f = 0, although the ensemble average of the ratio φf/φi is smaller than one (≈ 0.98),
in most individual instances the ratio is exactly one. In these cases, the throughput after the cascade
is determined by a node whose connectivity before and after the cascade is k = 1. Such a dangling end
has initial load equal to 1 which remains unchanged after the cascade as well i.e. the reduction in the
number of sources and sinks in the system has no effect on its load, unlike for other nodes which have
higher connectivity. Therefore the value of lj/Cj after the cascade for such a node often ends up being
the highest among all nodes, and by definition results in the throughput after the cascade being identical
to that before the cascade i.e. (1 + α). When f > 0, such dangling ends are removed as part of the
preemptive node removal process, and all surviving nodes end up experiencing a reduction in load due to
the reduced size of the surviving giant component. As a result, the final throughput is higher than the
initial throughput, resulting in φf/φi being greater than one.
In view of the observation that the pre-cascade vertex load distribution in the RGG is not highly
skewed, we propose a cascade mitigation strategy where rather than reducing the total load on the
network by the making a fraction of nodes “absent” from the network as we did for the preemptive
strategy, we assign a random fraction f of nodes to be altruists who cease to act as sources in the event
of a node failure, but continue conducting flow between other source-sink pairs. Figure 10A shows the
drop in the probability of a cascade as a function of the fraction f of altruistic nodes. Clearly, the drop
is significant in comparison to that achieved by the preemptive node removal strategy. We also show the
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results of a third strategy which involves all surviving nodes reducing the net current they inject into the
network (per sink) to a fraction f of its original value. We show the results (in red) for the two values
of f = 0.2, 0.4, and note that the probability of a cascade is approximately the same as that obtained
when only a fraction f of nodes are fully altruistic (i.e. inject no current into the network). Figures 10B
and C show comparative plots of the size of the surviving giant component obtained for each of these
strategies, conditioned on whether a cascade occurs or not. In both cases, the altruistic strategy, as
well as the overall current reduction strategy, show a significant improvement over the preemptive node
removal strategy. Understandably, this improvement comes at the cost of the overall throughput in the
network. Figure 10D shows the effective throughput in the surviving component φf normalized by the
initial throughput φi of the intact network, as a function of the altruist fraction f . For a principled
comparison of the throughputs before and after the cascade , we define the effective throughput of the
surviving giant component as the current per source on the intact network that would yield the same
total current as that flowing through the surviving giant component after the cascade. Mathematically,
when the number of altruist nodes in the surviving component is n, this effective throughput is written
as:
φf =
1
maxj{lj/Cj}
N − n
N
(7)
As seen in Fig. 10D, the ratio φf/φi decreases as the altruist fraction is increased, thus indicating that
the increased surviving fraction comes at the expense of the throughput of the network.
FIGURE 10
4. Cascade model on an empirical spatial network: The UCTE network
Thus far, our studies have been confined to a stylized model of a spatial network, viz. the RGG. We now
study the outcomes of the same cascading failure model on the UCTE network, several aspects of which,
have been studied elsewhere [5,32,46]. The network consists of N = 1254 transmission stations, with an
average degree 〈k〉 = 2.889, spanning 18 European countries in 2002. The network is disassortative with
an assortativity coefficient of −0.1, and with a higher average clustering coefficient than an ER graph
(0.127). Figure 11 shows several other properties of this network. The load appears to be positively
correlated with the degree (Fig. 11A), while the degree and load distributions span a relatively narrow
range (Fig. 11B,C respectively), as observed also for RGGs. It is worth noting however, that the variance
of loads is significant even for small degree values, which makes it difficult to straightforwardly assess the
load bearing responsibility of a node purely from its degree.
Figures 12 A,B show the cascades triggered on the UCTE network by the removal of a a single edge
and a single node, respectively. The non-monotonicity observed in G versus α for the model spatial
networks is also observed here, thus reinforcing the non-self-averaging nature of spatially constrained
networks. In the case of node-removal triggered cascades, removal of the highest-load node results in the
worst overall damage, as was also the case for RGGs.
The visualization panels presented in Fig. 13 provide some intuition on the cause of the observed
non-monotonicity in G as the tolerance parameter is increased. Figure 13 A shows the landscape of loads
on the network before the initiation of a cascade where the size of the node is directly proportional to the
load on the node. Figure 13 B shows, the state of the network with tolerance parameter α = 0.4 after a
cascade initiated by the removal of the highest load, has terminated. Figure 13 C shows a similar picture
for the case where the tolerance parameter is higher, (α = 0.45), but where the eventual damage is greater
(i.e. G is smaller than the value obtained for Fig.13 B). In this last panel, the network consists of several
nodes, indicated in red, that had been removed in the course of the cascade depicted in Fig.13 B, but
are now intact as a consequence of the increased tolerance. However, counter-intuitively, the survival of
these nodes result in wider load imbalances, resulting in a larger overall number of failures and a smaller
surviving giant component. Thus, to some degree, the nodes shown in red, behave like fuses which if
removed in the course of a cascade, end up saving a larger part of the network from failure. Dynamic
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Figure 9. Preemptive node removal in RGGs. (A) Probability that a cascade occurs after
removal of the node with highest load, despite a fraction f of nodes being preemptively removed
immediately after the initial trigger. (B) Fractional size of the largest surviving network component G
as a function of preemptively removed fraction f , when there is a cascade. (C) Fractional size of the
largest surviving network component G as a function of preemptively removed fraction f for a single
network instance for different values of the tolerance parameter α. (D) The ratio of the throughput
(defined in text) of the surviving giant component and the throughput of the original network as a
function of the altruist node fraction. The red circle corresponds to the case when there no nodes are
preemptively removed. Network parameters are: N = 1500, 〈k〉 = 6.0.
visualizations of the progression of the cascades resulting in the final states shown in Figs.13B,C are
provided in Supplementary Movies S1 and S2, respectively. A feature that becomes apparent in these
dynamic visualizations is the non-local nature of the progression of the cascade. As pointed out in [4]
such non-local progression is commonly observed in real cascade situations, and is a feature which can be
reproduced by a more realistic DC power flow model, but not by simpler epidemic or percolation based
models. Thus it is worth noting that the model presented in this work, despite being simpler than the DC
power flow model used in [4], can nevertheless capture a distinctive attribute of real cascade progression.
Next, we compare the two cascade mitigation strategies, viz. preemptive node removal and assignment
of altruistic nodes, for cascades initiated by highest load removal on the UCTE network. As Fig. 14 A
and B show, the altruistic strategy generally results in a larger surviving giant component after the
cascade, than in the case when preemptive node removal is employed. It is also worth noting that non-
monotonicities due to the lack of self-averaging in the cascade process, manifest themselves in these plots
as well.
We conclude with an investigation of whether, in the case of multiple initial failures, the failures being
spatially localized has any effect on the severity of the cascade. Figure 15A shows for a given value of the
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Figure 10. Increasing the resilience of the network by introducing altruist nodes. (A)
Probability that a cascade is triggered for an altruist/preemptively removed fraction f . The orange
squares indicated the probability of cascade when no nodes (other than the initial cascade-triggering
node) are removed, but when the current per source is reduced by 20% (upper square) or 80% (lower
square) immediately after the initial node removal. (B) The fractional size of the surviving giant
component G when a cascade is triggered, as a function of the altruist/preemptively-removed node
fraction. Also shown are the results when the current per source is reduced by 20% (upper square) or
80% (lower square) immediately after the initial node removal, which coincide with the f = 0.2 and
f = 0.8 results respectively for altruistic node removal. (C) Similar to (B), but for the cases where a
cascade is not triggered. (D) The ratio of the effective throughput (defined in text) of the surviving
giant component and the throughput of the original network as a function of the altruist node fraction.
The red circle corresponds to the case when there are no altruist nodes. Network parameters for all
these plots are: N = 1500, 〈k〉 = 6.0, α=0.15.
tolerance parameter α, the size of the surviving giant component G as a function of the number of nodes
removed, for concentrated and random failures on an RGG. Random failures are only marginally more
destructive than concentrated ones, which is understandable in light of how the different cascade stages
resulting from just a single node’s removal can cover a wide spatial spread, as seen in Fig. 7. We arrive at
a similar conclusion for the case of concentrated and randomly located failures within the UCTE network
from the results shown in Fig. 15B. Dynamic visualizations of the progression of spatially localized and
distributed cascades on the UCTE network for the same number of initially removed nodes are provided
in Supplementary Movies S3 and S4, respectively.
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Figure 11. Characteristics of the UCTE network. (A) The average load across nodes of degree k
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Figure 12. Cascades on the UCTE network. (A) Cascades triggered by the removal of a single
node where the node was chosen using three different criteria i.e. randomly, highest load or highest
degree. (B) Cascades triggered by the removal of a single edge where the edge was either chosen
randomly or was the one with the highest load. Data obtained for cascade triggered by the random
removal of a single node (edge) were averaged over 100 different scenarios.
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α = 0.45
Figure 13. UCTE network snapshots before and after cascades (A) The intact network with
node sizes in proportion to their respective steady-state loads. (B) The network and the loads after a
highest-load-removal-triggered cascade has terminated, with the tolerance parameter α = 0.4. (C) The
network and the loads after a highest-load-removal-triggered cascade has terminated, with the tolerance
parameter α = 0.45. The red nodes here indicate nodes that were removed in the cascade leading to
(B), but survived in the cascade leading to (C).
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Figure 15. Cascades triggered by concentrated versus randomly distributed removals. (A)
Fractional surviving giant component size after a cascade as a function of number of initial nodes
removed in concentrated and random removals for RGGs with N = 1500 and 〈k〉 = 6. (B) Fractional
surviving giant component size after a cascade as a function of number of initial nodes removed in
concentrated and random removals for the UCTE network.
Discussion
In summary, we have attempted a thorough analysis of the characteristics of cascading failures and strate-
gies for their mitigation on spatially constrained networks, including a model of such networks viz. the
random geometric graph, as well as a real-world power transmission network. The key finding worth
emphasizing from these studies is the inherent lack of self-averaging for cascade processes on spatial
networks. In other words, conclusions gleaned from aggregate statistics on an ensemble of such net-
works, yield information of little value pertaining to a single network instance. For example, in contrast
to the observation for an ensemble of RGGs, for a single network instance, increasing the excess load
bearing capacity does not necessarily reduce the severity of the cascade in a monotonic fashion. Thus
a straightforward measure for cascade prevention could yield counter-intuitive results. We demonstrate
that increasing the effective dimensionality of the system i.e. easing the effect of the spatial constraints
by introducing rewired long-range links eliminates these non-intuitive features. A standard cascade mit-
19
igation strategy, extensively studied in the past, of preemptively removing a fraction of underperforming
nodes does not effectively reduce the severity of cascades on spatially constrained networks, due to the
fairly narrow initial range of loads in spatial networks. Instead, the strategy of introducing a fraction of
altruistic nodes appears to be a more effective alternative. This holds true both for the model networks
as well as for the empirical network. Finally, we also find that cascades resulting from spatially con-
centrated node failures do not appear to be significantly less destructive than ones that are distributed
over the network. Thus, our results paint a complex picture for how failure cascades induced by load
redistribution on spatial networks carrying distributed flow propagate through the network. In short, for
spatial networks, details specific to a network instance play a very important role in determining strate-
gies to increase the resilience of the network against cascading failures, and methods based on aggregate
observations from a network ensemble will present substantial pitfalls.
Note: Data on the UCTE network [32] that we used in this work was obtained from the website
http://www.see.ed.ac.uk/~jbialek/Europe_load_flow which is currently non-functional. A pro-
cessed version of the original data (the UCTE network structure) can be obtained by emailing the
corresponding author (SS).
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Supporting Information
Supplementary Figure S1. Cascade realizations on a single RGG of size N = 1300 where
conductances on links are inversely proportional to their lengths. The behavior of the surviving
giant component sizeG as a function of the tolerance parameter α (three individual realizations are shown)
is practically indistinguishable from that found in the case where conductances on all links are identical,
shown in Fig. 4A in the main text. All remaining parameters (besides conductances) and simulation
details are identical to that in Fig. 4A.
Supplementary Figure S2. Effect of rewiring links in an RGG with link-length dependent
conductances. As the rewiring probability p is increased, the non-monotonicities in G as a function of
tolerance parameter α gradually disappear, similarly to the case where link conductances are independent
of their length (see Fig. 5). Simulations were performed with N = 1300 and 〈k〉 = 5.
Supplementary Movie S1. Progression of the cascade initiated by the removal of the node with the
highest load on the UCTE network (N = 1254) with tolerance parameter α = 0.4. Node sizes are
proportional to the load on them. The single orange node at the beginning of the movie indicates the
node with the largest node which is removed to trigger a cascade. The overloaded nodes in subsequent
stages are shown in orange before they are removed. The total number of nodes removed in the cascade
is 167, and the number of nodes in the surviving giant component is 465.
Supplementary Movie S2. Progression of the cascade initiated by the removal of the node
with the highest load on the UCTE network with tolerance parameter α = 0.45. Although
the tolerance parameter is greater than in the case of Movie S1, a greater number of nodes, 299, fail in
the cascade, and the resulting giant component is also smaller, with 315 nodes. The nodes shown in gray
indicate those nodes which failed in course of the cascade occurring for α = 0.40 (shown in Movie S1),
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but survived when α was increased to 0.45. The survival of these nodes potentially plays a role in making
the cascade more severe. All other color and node size conventions are identical to those in Movie S1.
Supplementary Movie S3. Progression of a cascade initiated by a spatially localized removal
of 9 nodes. Color and node size conventions are as explained in caption for Movie S1. The tolerance
parameter used here is α = 0.15. The number of nodes removed in the course of the cascade is 297, and
the number of nodes in the surviving giant component is 329.
Supplementary Movie S4. Progression of a cascade initiated by distributed (random) re-
moval of 9 nodes. Color and node size conventions are as explained in caption for Movie S1. The
tolerance parameter used here is α = 0.15. The number of nodes removed in the course of the cascade is
297 (same as for Movie S3), and the number of nodes in the surviving giant component is 374.
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Supporting Figure 1. Cascade realizations on a single RGG of size N = 1300 where
conductances on links are inversely proportional to their lengths. The behavior of the
surviving giant component size G as a function of the tolerance parameter α (three individual
realizations are shown) is practically indistinguishable from that found in the case where conductances
on all links are identical, shown in Fig. 4A in the main text. All remaining parameters (besides
conductances) and simulation details are identical to that in Fig. 4A.
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Supporting Figure 2. Effect of rewiring links in an RGG with link-length dependent
conductances. As the rewiring probability p is increased, the non-monotonicities in G as a function of
tolerance parameter α gradually disappear, similarly to the case where link conductances are
independent of their length (see Fig. 5). Simulations were performed with N = 1300 and 〈k〉 = 5.
